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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Few, if any, political debates kindle stronger convictions and more impassioned activism than 
abortion.1 Every year, approximately 50,000 abortion activists assemble at the annual “March for 
Life” in Washington.2 Members of Congress are inundated with calls and letters from constituents 
expressing their views on abortion.3 The entrances of abortion clinics across the country are 
routinely blockaded by picket lines of protesters.4 Still other activists channel their convictions 
through service, ranging from volunteering at pro-life counseling clinics to caring for foster 
children.5 While most abortion activists choose peaceful demonstration, the sad reality is that a small 
group of extremists consider aggression to be the most desirable solution. This growing proclivity 
toward aggression has given rise to a disturbing increase in violence against abortion providers and 
clinics in recent years. 
Concomitantly, society has undergone another phenomenon: the growth of the Internet.6 The 
number of Internet users has doubled in every year since 19937 and today has burgeoned to 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2001; B.A. Georgetown University, 1998. I thank Professor Owen Fiss for his 
guidance and invaluable comments on various drafts of this Note, Tennille Neuharth for her editorial assistance, and 
Hae Jung Moon whose brilliant comments sparked my interest in this subject. 
1 See, e.g., DONALD P. JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES, 4 (1993) (describing abortion as one of the 
most divisive issues of our time, with some viewing the act as slaughter and others as a test of society’s commitment to 
individual liberty, personal autonomy, and women’s welfare); Allen Buchanan, Ethical Responsibilities of Patients and 
Clinical Geneticists, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 391, 393 (1998) (identifying the morality of abortion as “one of 
the most divisive issues our society has known”). For example, a 1998 poll conducted by Market Strategies revealed that 
40% of respondents would not vote for a presidential candidate who had different views on abortion. See MARKET 
STRATEGIES, Abortion, Elections, Mar. 30, 1998 (“Would you vote for a candidate whose position on abortion is 
different from your own?” Yes: 38%; No: 40%; Depends (voluntary response): 18%; Don’t know: 3%; Refused to 
answer: 1%). 
2 See Tamara Jones, The Children’s Crusade; They Are Young, Spirited and Deeply Committed, and They Think of 
Abortion as a Holocaust. But Will the New Generation of Activists Repeat the Mistakes of Their Elders?, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at W7 (describing the events surrounding the annual “March For Life” in Washington, D.C.); 
Joyce Price, Violence-sparked Tension Won’t Stop ’95 March for Life, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1995, at A3 (previewing 
“March for Life” and explaining why “tension between the sides in the abortion debate is at an all-time high”). 
3 See What’s Ahead in the Battle Over Abortion, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 19, 1998 (noting that Catholic 
churches will distribute 11 million postcards for parishioners to mail to senators this year urging the Senate to ban 
“partial-birth” abortions); Dave Williams, Mail Gives Congressmen Pipeline to Voters, STATES NEWS SERVICE, 
Oct. 31, 1997 (discussing the influx of constituent mail received by Members of Congress). 
4 See Kevin Fagan, Battle Over Right to Choose; Abortion Clinic in Redding Stirs Up Fervor on Both Sides of Issue, 
S.F. CHRON., May 4, 1999, at A1 (discussing the activities of pro-life and pro-choice protestors outside an abortion 
clinic in Redding, California). 
5 See Jamie Tobias Neely, Terrorism Deserves No Handmaidens, SPOKESMAN-REV., Mar. 11, 1999, at (referring to 
volunteering in a pro-life clinic and caring for a foster child as constructive ways to express conviction against abortion). 
6 The Internet can be described as a large environment, composed of a patchwork of thousands of smaller networks 
across the world. These networks are able to communicate with each other by employing a consistent suite of software 
protocol. See Michael Johns, Comment, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines New 
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approximately 200 million worldwide.8 Like many controversial debates, abortion has found its way 
into cyberspace.9 A quick Internet search will reveal countless newsgroups, listserves, and websites 
championing pro-life and pro-choice propaganda.10 Another consequence of the Internet, however, 
has been the emergence of websites and discussion groups presenting views that many find 
abhorrent.11 According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, a leading monitor of hate speech on 
the Web, the number of websites featuring hate speech has ballooned from one in 1995 to 250 
today.12 These developments test our commitment to the First Amendment, an essential cornerstone 
upon which our democracy rests,13 as they may force us to tolerate websites that most find repulsive 
in the name of free speech.14 
These two forces, the increase in violence toward abortion providers and the constitutional call to 
protect cyberspace speech, recently came to a head in a lawsuit surrounding a controversial anti-
abortion website. This website, commonly known as the “Nuremburg Files,” provided a list of 
abortion doctors with personal information in a manner that some have considered tantamount to a 
“hit list.”15 In response, a coalition of pro-choice organizations and physicians listed on the 
“Nuremburg Files” brought action against several pro-life organizations and individuals associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383, 1383 n.7 (1996);see also generally DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET 
BOOK 69-70 (1994). 
7 See Sarah B. Hogan, Note, To Net or Not to Net: Singapore’s Regulation of the Internet, 51 FED. COM. L.J. 429, 432 
(1999) (citing Arul Louis, Answernet, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1996, at 46, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
DLYNWS File). 
8 See Hogan, supra note 7, at 432 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997)). 
9 The term, ²cyberspace,² was coined by science fiction author, William Gibson. See WILLIAM GIBSON, 
NEUROMANCER 51 (1984). ²Cyberspace² encompasses all electronic messaging and information systems, including 
the Internet. See Johns, supra note 6, at 1386 (citing Anne M. Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the 
Privacy Police?, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 63, 63 (1995)). 
10 See, e.g., National Abortion and Reproduction Rights Action League (NARAL) (visited May 18, 1999) <http:// 
www.naral.org>; People for Life (visited May 18, 1999) <http://www.peopleforlife.org>; Pro-Woman, Pro-Life (visited 
May 18, 1999) <http://www.gargaro.com/noabort.html>. 
11 For example, one particularly nauseating website displays the head of Mathew Shephard, a young man brutally 
murdered because of his sexuality, bouncing in a sea of flames while visitors are updated on how many days he has been 
in hell. See Dennis McCafferty, Www.hate.comes To Your Home: Is It Free Speech? Or Does It Incite Violence?, USA 
TODAY, Mar. 28, 1999, at 6. 
12 See id. 
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the freedom of speech”); see also, e.g., Turner 
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (“Each person should decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs 
deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rests upon this ideal.”); 
NAACP v. Button, 37 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (freedom of speech is “supremely precious in our society”). 
14 Justice Anthony Kennedy articulated this challenge well in his concurrence in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
(holding that the First Amendment protected the defendant’s burning an American flag during a protest rally): 
“sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law 
and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result.” Id. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is a well-established 
tenet of constitutional law that the distaste we may feel toward the content or message of a protected expression “cannot 
detain us from discharging our duty as guardian of the Constitution.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of 
Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (vulgar expression displayed in a 
public courthouse), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(Ku Klux Klan cross-burning), Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978) (neo-Nazi march through a Jewish 
neighborhood), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)). 
15 See Michele Mandel, Fanning the Flames of Hatred, TORONTO SUN, Apr. 4, 1999, at 5. 
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with the website, alleging that the website constitutes a threat to their safety.16 On February 2, 1999, 
the plaintiffs prevailed in the first round of the battle, winning a $ 107 million jury verdict in Planned 
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Advocates.17 An appeal from the defendants seems 
imminent.18 In fact, some believe this case invokes sufficiently serious constitutional implications to 
make its way to the United States Supreme Court.19 
The aim of this Note is to examine standards of First Amendment scrutiny as applied to the 
“Nuremburg Files.” This Note argues that the “true threat” standard, as applied by the jury, is an 
improper standard of review. Although the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the verdict relied on 
an erroneously articulated “true threat” standard and thus stands in serious peril of being reversed 
on appeal. Instead, some have suggested that more appropriate review resides in the incitement 
standard. Yet, this Note concludes that the “Nuremburg Files” website still survives constitutional 
muster under the incitement standard. Part II begins by offering a concise history of Planned 
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Advocates.20 
Then, Part III evaluates the “true threat” standard as developed by Watts21 and its progeny. This 
Part proceeds to examine the standard as articulated in the jury instructions. Part III reveals several 
major errors in the judge’s representation of the “true threat” standard and concludes that, under a 
properly-articulated “true threat” standard, the website should receive First Amendment protection. 
In Part IV, this Note turns its attention to an alternative standard for First Amendment scrutiny, 
Brandenburg’s22 incitement standard. Part IV concludes that the incitement standard protects the 
“Nuremburg Files.” In conclusion, this Note proposes the creation of a modified standard that is 
responsive to the demands of the Internet. 
II. BACKGROUND ON PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE 
ACTIVISTS 
Pro-life activist Neal Horsley created the “Nuremburg Files” as part of his Christian Gallery 
website23 under the purported rationale of maintaining a list of abortion providers to facilitate their 
                                                          
16 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 
1184 (D. Or. Oct. 14, 1998). The lawsuit also cited as threats “wanted” posters of abortion providers and bumper 
stickers advocating their execution. Id. at 1186-87. This Note, however, will focus on the free speech implications of the 
“Nuremburg Files” website. 
17 Jury Verdict, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, No. 95-
1671-JO (D. Or. filed Feb. 2, 1999). 
18 See Patrick McMahon, Judge Agrees Web Site a Threat, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 1999, at A2 (Defendant Andrew 
Burnett stating, “[Judge Jones’s permanent injunction] allows us to go ahead and begin the appeal.”). 
19 See Perspect, Free Speech and Limiting a Website, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 7, 1999, at D2 (“The decision almost 
definitely will be appealed, and may find its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.”); see also, ACLU OF OREGON, Press 
Release, Statement on Verdict in Planned Parenthood “Wanted Posters” Case, Feb. 2, 1999 (“This decision will almost 
certainly be appealed to the 9th Circuit, and it may eventually reach the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
20 Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). 
21 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (creating the “true threat” standard for First Amendment review). 
22 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (establishing the incitement standard for First Amendment review). 
23 See Patrick McMahon, Anti-abortion Site Kicked off Web, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1999, at A2; Lynne K. Varner, 
Doctor’s Death Leaves Abortion Providers More Fearful Than Ever; Threats from Radicals Force Some to Wear 
Bulletproof Vests, Carry Firearms, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 8, 1998, at A14. 
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prosecution when abortion is criminalized.24 Horsley first posted the ²Nuremburg Files² on the 
Internet in January 1997,25 and the website eventually listed about 200 “abortionists.”26 Branding 
these abortion providers as “baby butchers,”27 the website supplied extensive personal information, 
including pictures, addresses, spouses’ names, and phone numbers.28 This information was situated 
below what resembled blood dripping from the website’s logo29 and near a bloodied cartoon 
punctuating its screaming headlines about baby killers.30 When a doctor listed on the page was killed, 
the website’s operators immediately struck through the doctor’s name; when a doctor was injured, 
the operators printed the name in gray.31 
In 1995, two abortion clinics, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette and Portland 
Feminist Women’s Health Center, along with five individual physicians, brought action against pro-
life activists claiming their statements in certain posters and other documents constituted “true 
threats” to the plaintiffs’ lives.32 Alleging that these threats violate the Freedom of Access to Clinic 
Entrance Act of 1994 (FACE)33 and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),34 the plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief.35 The defendants, who included the 
                                                          
24 The website draws its names from the Nuremburg war criminals. The operators contend that they hope to use the 
information from the website to prosecute the doctors and pro-choice activists before a Nuremburg-style tribunal. 
According to the website: “One of the great tragedies of the Nuremburg trials after WWII was that complete 
information and documented evidence had not been collected so many war criminals went free or were only found guilty 
of minor crimes. . . . We do not want the same thing to happen when the day comes to charge abortionists with their 
crimes.” The Nuremburg Files (visited May 9, 1999) <http://www.lektrik.com/PPvsACLA/home.htm>. See also 
Editorial, Free Speech or Threats?, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 5, 1999, at 8B; Elaine Lafferty, Ruling Against Anti-
Abortion Website Raises Storm in US over Rights: The Anti-abortionists Who Ran the “Nuremburg Files” Website 
Were Fined $ 105 Million This Week, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at 14. 
The original “Nuremburg Files,” as posted by Horsley, was removed from the Internet following the resolution of 
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Advocates. The Lektrik Press has since posted a copy of the 
“Nuremburg Files” in the name of free speech at <http://www.lektrik.com/PPysACLA/home.htm>. For my 
discussion of the content of the website, I will be relying on the Lektrik Press posting. 
25 Brief for the ACLU of Oregon, supra note 24, at 9. 
26 See James C. Goodale, Can Planned Parenthood Silence the Pro-Life Web Site, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 2, 1999, at 3. In 
addition to these 200 “abortionists,” the site listed another 200 individuals, including the Vice President of the United 
States, numerous U.S. Senators and Representatives, several Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, and various federal 
court judges. See Brief for the ACLU of Oregon, supra note 24, at 9. 
27 See Jacqueline Soteropoulos, Florida Doctors Named on Web Site Fear for Lives, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 3, 1999, at 12. 
28 See id. The page further invites readers to send in doctors’ addresses, license plate numbers, and names of their 
children. Se id. 
29 See Mandel, supra note 15, at 5; Lynne K. Varner, Tension Rises for Abortion Doctors-N.Y. Slaying Puts Physicians 
on Edge, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at B1. 
30 See Editorial, supra note 24, at 8B. 
31 See id. 
32 See Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Or. 1998). 
33 FACE, in pertinent part, makes liable for civil and criminal penalties whoever: 
by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or 
attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to 
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive 
health services. 
34 RICO, in pertinent part, states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of 
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
35 See Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1184. 
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American Coalition of Life Activists, the Advocates for Life Ministries, and individuals active in 
those organizations,36 responded by asserting First Amendment protection.37 Horsley, the creator of 
the “Nuremburg Files,” was not named in the suit, although the individual defendants were alleged 
to have been associated with the website and to have helped operate it.38 For that reason, the 
“Nuremburg Files” was included as part of the alleged threats against the plaintiffs. 
In his jury instructions, U.S. District Judge Robert Jones relied on the “true threat” standard. In 
short, Judge Jones informed the jury that to move on to the issue of FACE and RICO violations, 
the jury must first conclude that the posters and website were “true threats,” hence unprotected by 
the First Amendment.39 Applying these instructions, the jury concluded that the defendants’ actions 
constituted “true threats” that violated FACE and RICO, and awarded a $ 107 million judgment.40 
Immediately following the verdict, the defendants vowed to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.41 
On February 25, 1999, Judge Jones upheld the jury verdict in a strongly worded endorsement, 
proclaiming that the “Nuremburg Files” and the anti-abortion posters were “blatant and illegal 
communications of true threats to kill.”42 Concluding that the plaintiffs lacked an adequate remedy 
of law,43 Judge Jones issued a permanent injunction banning the defendants from threatening the 
doctors and clinics in any manner, including contributing to the website or producing additional 
posters.44 Judge Jones defended the need for injunctive relief by contending, “Each day, plaintiffs’ 
lives are endangered because of defendants’ unlawful threats against them.”45 According to the 
judge, “Monetary relief alone cannot address this harm.”46 
III. THE “NUREMBURG FILES” AND THE “TRUE THREAT” STANDARD 
This Part considers whether the “Nuremburg Files” should be constitutionally protected under the 
“true threat” standard. First, it takes a close look at Judge Jones’s articulation of the standard in his 
jury instructions. Next, this Part examines the “true threat” standard as created by the Supreme 
                                                          
36 See Judy L. Thomas, Area Doctor Pressing Abortion Lawsuit: He’ll Join Others Around the Country Trying to Rein in 
Militant Opponents, KANSAS CITY STAR, Jan. 4, 1999, at B1. 
37 See Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
38 Free Speech and Limiting a Website, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 7, 1999, at D2; Lafferty, supra note 24, at 14. 
39 Jury Instructions at 14-16, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Or. 1998) [hereinafter Jury Instructions]. 
40 SeeJury Verdict, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. 
Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D. Or. 1998);see also, e.g., Patrick McMahon, Doctors Unlikely To Collect Jury Award: Web Site 
Will Stay, Creator Says, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 1999, at A3. 
41 See, e.g., Abortion Foes Lose Web Site Suit / Jury Says Tactics Threaten Doctors, NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1999; Robert 
MacMillan, Wanted Posters: Free Speech or Death Threat?, NEWSBYTES, Feb. 3, 1999. 
42 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, No. 95-1671-JO (D. 
Or. Mar. 16, 1999); see also Associated Press, Anti-abortion Web Site, Posters ’Blatant’ Threats, Judge Writes, FLA. 
TODAY, Feb. 26, 1999; Lauren Dodge, Abortion Foes Banned from Web Site, AP ONLINE, Feb. 26, 1999. 
43 Planned Parenthood, No. 95-1671-JO (citing Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Intra Brokers, Inc., 24 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). 
44 Id.; see also McMahon, supra note 18. 
45 Planned Parenthood, No. 95-1671-JO. 
46 Id. 
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Court and developed subsequently by lower courts. A comparison of the jury instructions with the 
appropriate standard reveals several serious flaws in Judge Jones’s instructions. These flawed 
instructions may have adversely influenced the jury; this Part concludes that a properly-articulated 
“true threat” standard affords constitutional protection for the ²Nuremburg Files.² 
A. The Standard Articulated in the Jury Instructions 
In his jury instructions, Judge Jones defined a “true threat” as occurring “when a reasonable person 
making the statement would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom it is 
communicated as a serious expression of an intent to bodily harm or assault.”47 The judge stressed 
that this standard does not look at the intent or motive of the defendants, but what a reasonable 
person would have foreseen: 
Even if you believe that the defendants did not intend the statements to be threatening, you 
must still find those statements to be threats if you conclude that a reasonable person would 
have foreseen that those statements, in their entire factual context, would have been 
interpreted as statements of an intent to bodily harm or assault.48 
In other words, the “test is not the subjective view of the defendants, but the objective view of a 
reasonable person.”49 
Judge Jones’s instructions particularly emphasized the need to evaluate the total context and 
circumstances of the statements. 
The judge offered a very broad definition of context:  
The word “context” means all of the facts and information that would have been known to 
the person making the statement, including the events surrounding each publication of the 
statement and the reaction of the listeners to it. The context in this case may include other 
posters you heard about, other statements and actions by defendants and others, the history 
of anti-abortion violence, and the reaction of the listeners. . . . The context also includes 
evidence of the defendants’ motives or intent in creating, preparing or disseminating the 
statement at issue.50 
This generously broad definition of context enlarged the scope of activities that could classify as 
threats. 
Judge Jones noted that “even a statement that is ambiguous, subtle or conditional can amount to a 
threat in light of the factual context in which the statement was made.”51 
                                                          
47 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 14. 
48 Id. at 14. 
49  
50 Id. at 14-15. 
51  
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B. 
The Supreme Court established the “true threat” standard in 1969 in Watts v. United States.52 Robert 
Watts was convicted of violating an anti-threat statute which prohibited any person from 
“knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the 
President of the United States.”53 Watts’s alleged threat targeted the life of President Lyndon B. 
Johnson during an anti-war protest.54 The Court emphasized that the statute must be interpreted 
within the constraints of the First Amendment, with the distinction made between what is a threa 
and what is constitutionally-protected speech.55 
In forging this distinction, the Court examined the context of Watts’s statement, and determined 
that Watts’s words were political hyperbole that fell short of a “true threat.”56 Explaining this 
political hyperbole exception, the Court emphasized “a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”57 Moreover, the Court noted that the language used in the political arena is often 
“vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”58 The Court concluded that, taken in context and regarding the 
expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, Watts’s statements 
must be interpreted as nothing more than “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a 
political opposition to the President.”59 
A concise, per curiam opinion, Watts did not elaborate further on the specifics of the ²true threat² 
standard.60 At the very least, however, the Court’s protection of a statement explicitly expressing a 
desire to shoot the president reveals that the “true threat” standard imposes a lofty hurdle to 
overcome. 
                                                          
52 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
53 The statute, in pertinent part, provides that: 
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance . . . any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily 
harm upon the President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President . . ., or knowingly and 
willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, President-elect, Vice President . . . shall be fined 
not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
(a). 
54 Watts stated: 
They always holler at us to get an education. And I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I 
have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the 
first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J. 
55 See id. at 707. 
56 See id. at 708. 
57 Id. at 708 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (internal quotations omitted). 
58 See id. at 708. 
59 Id. 
60 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas criticized the Court’s refusal to hold a hearing for this case. Fortas wrote that 
the Court was wrong to “not decide the case on its merits and to adjudicate the difficult questions that it presents.” Id. at 
712 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
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Although the Supreme Court has never directly returned to the definition of a “true threat,”61 
various lower court decision have continued to indicate that all but the most egregious threats 
receive constitutional protection. One of the most significant decisions in this regard is the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Kelner.62 Russell Kelner was convicted for transmitting in interstate 
commerce a communication containing a “threat to injure the person of another,”63 when he 
threatened to assassinate Yasser Arafat prior to Arafat’s visit to New York City.64 Kelner made his 
threat unambiguously clear during a television interview, boasting that his men were armed and 
ready to assassinate Arafat. Kelner even made the bold promise, “We are planning to assassinate Mr. 
Arafat”65 and explained that “everything is planned in detail”66 and “it’s going to come off.”67 
Affirming Kelner’s conviction, the Second Circuit elucidated the requirements of the “true threat” 
standard. Although the court held that Kelner’s actions did not fall under the protective umbrella of 
the First Amendment, the Second Circuit’s definition of a threat set a high standard to overcome. 
Rejecting the argument that Kelner was expressing mere ideas, the court held that his actions were 
not protected under the political hyperbole exception of Watts.68 The Second Circuit further noted 
that Kelner fully comprehended his threats, transmitting them “knowingly and willfully.”69 Perhaps 
Kelner’s most useful pronouncement was its definition of threats that transgress the bounds of the 
First Amendment as those “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to the person 
threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution . . . .”70 
Since Kelner, other courts have offered modest modifications to the “true threat” standard. The Fifth 
Circuit, first in United States v. Bozeman71 and later in United States v. Myers,72held that, to constitute a 
                                                          
61 While the Court has cited Watts on occasion, the Court has failed to further develop the ²true threat² standard in other 
opportunities. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (holding a ²hate crime² ordinance facially invalid 
under First Amendment and writing that, under Watts, threats of violence have special force when directed toward the 
President); NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 n.46 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment 
protected a nonviolent civil rights boycott and noting that the Court recognized in Watts that “offensive” and “coercive” 
speech is protected by the First Amendment); see also Robert Kurman Kelner, Note, United States v. Baker; Revisiting 
Threats and the First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 289 n.13 (1998) (“The Court has cited Watts on occasion, but 
has not engaged in an extended effort to develop its true threat doctrine.”). 
62 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976). 
63 The statute, in pertinent part, provides that: 
Whoever transmits in interstate commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or 
any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned not more than 
five years or both. 
(c). 
64 See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1020-21. 
65 Id. at 1021. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1025 
69 Id. at 1025 
70 Id. at 1027 
71 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that defendant’s statement, “I will kill him,” when taken in context, “would 
have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor” and constituted a 
threat), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975). 
72 104 F.3d. 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court’s finding of a threat and noting that, pursuant to Bozeman, 
a threat must be considered in context), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1218 (1997). 
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threat, a statement in context must “have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its 
originator will act according to its tenor.”73 Most recently, in 1997 the First Circuit set forth a clear 
rule for defining a threat in United States v. Fulmer,74 a case reviewing a conviction for threatening a 
federal agent.75 In Fulmer, the First Circuit wrote that “the appropriate standard under which a 
defendant may be convicted for making a threat is whether he should have reasonably foreseen that 
statement . . . would be taken as a threat by those to whom it was made.”76 
Of particular relevance to the “Nuremburg Files” is the recent federal district court decision in 
United States v. Baker,77 one of the first cases to raise First Amendment issues in relation to the 
Internet.78 At issue in Baker was a story posted on a newsgroup by a University of Michigan student 
named Jacob Alkhabaz79 and electronic correspondences between Alkhabaz and another individual.80 
These postings described the rape, torture and murder of a woman, and discussed in detail 
Alkhabaz’s plans to commit rape at the University of Michigan.81 Indicted with violating 18 U.S.C. § 
875 (c),82 Alkhabaz argued that application of this federal anti-threat statute to his email 
transmissions pushed the boundaries of the statute beyond the limits of the First Amendment. 83 
District Court Judge Avern Cohn set forth standards to determine what actions constitute “true 
threats.” Like prior decisions, Baker demonstrated the high hurdle required under the “true threat” 
standard, as well as the reluctance of courts to punish all but the most egregious threats.84 Judge 
Cohn reiterated Kelner’s standard, writing that, under Watts, “only unequivocal, unconditional and 
specific expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury may be punished.”85 Applying this 
standard, the court held that Alkhabaz’s actions were constitutionally protected. In particular, Judge 
Cohn wrote that the electronic messages expressing a desire to commit rape were too indeterminate, 
as they failed to “refer to a sufficiently specific class of targets.”86 Similarly, the court held that the 
                                                          
73 Myers, 495 F.2d at 79 (quoting Bozeman, 495 F.2d at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
74 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997). 
75 See id. at 1489-90. 
76 Id. at 1491. 
77 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
78 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379 n.3 (citing Megan Garvey, Crossing the Line on the Info Highway: He Put His Ugly 
Face on the Underneath. Then He Ran Smack into Reality, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1995, at H1; Joan Lowenstein, 
Perspective: How Free is Free Speech in Cyberspace?, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at 1); Kelner, supra note 61. 
79 Jacob Alkhabaz’s alias is Jacob Baker. See Kelner, supra note 61. The district court used the name Baker, while the 
Sixth Circuit used the name Alkhabaz. For this Note, I will refer to the defendant as Alkhabaz. 
80 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379. 
81 See id. at 1379. 
82 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); see supra note 63. 
83 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1375. 
84 See Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment, and Hate On-line: Recent Developments, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673, 680 
(1997) (Baker “illustrated the reluctance of courts to punish all but the most egregious of threats under this ’true threat’ 
standard.”). 
85 Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382. 
86 Id. at 1387-88. 
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discussion of kidnapping was not “an unequivocal and specific expression of intention immediately 
to carry out the actions discussed.”87 
A glance at Ninth Circuit jurisprudence would also be instructive.88 The common thread in Ninth 
Circuit “true threat” decisions is the need to demonstrate specific intent to threaten. In 1988, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of threats in United States v. Twine,89 a case involving conviction for 
specific telephone threats of rape and kidnapping.90 The court upheld the conviction, and held that 
18 U.S.C. §§ 875(c)91 and 87692 require a showing of specific intent.93 Soon after, in United States v. 
King,94 a case involving the alleged mailing of threatening communication, the Ninth Circuit again 
held that proof of specific intent is required for conviction.95 A final important feature of Ninth 
Circuit jurisprudence has been its consideration of the factual context of the alleged threat.96 
C. The Failure of the Jury Instructions to Reflect This “True Threat” Standard 
Judge Jones’s representation of the “true threat” standard has sparked concerns from both sides of 
the aisle. Several legal experts fear that the judge interpreted the threats too literally.97 The American 
Civil Liberties Union, which authored an amicus curiae brief in the district court supporting the 
plaintiffs, has expressed concerns that the decision could serve to prevent other advocacy groups 
from expressing their views.98 In fact, the ACLU plans to join in an appeal, saying that the decision 
impinges on the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.99 In particular, the ACLU believes that 
                                                          
87 Id. at 1389. Baker was ultimately appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit, however, never addressed the First 
Amendment issue since the court held that the indictment failed, as a matter of law, to reach the threshold requirement 
for an allegation of violation of § 875(c). See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997). 
88 The Ninth Circuit has controlling jurisdiction over the U.S. District Court for Oregon. 
89 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988). 
90 Twine, 853 F.2d at 677. 
91 See supra note 82. 
92 Section 876 provides that: 
Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered as aforesaid, any communications with or without a 
name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to 
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined not more 
than $ 1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
93 Twine, 853 F.2d at 680. Courts have repeatedly relied on the “specific intent” element as a safeguard against 
suppressing protected speech. See Kelner, supra note 61, at 304-07. 
94 122 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1997). 
95 See id. at 811 (affirming Twine’s requirement of a showing of specific intent and writing that the court’s “conclusion 
in Twine that § 876 requires specific intent to threaten . . . is Twine’s central holding”). 
96 See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (stressing the need to evaluate alleged threats 
in light of the entire factual context), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1048 (1996); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 
1262 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the 
surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners.”); United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 2382) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 3631, a 
statute prohibiting interference with housing rights by threat of force), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). 
97 See Lafferty, supra note 24, at 14. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. While Judge Jones’s instructions focused on determining whether a reasonable person administering the 
website and directing its content would have known that those named persons would feel threatened, the ACLU of 
Oregon believes that “the defendants’ intent to threaten the abortion providers must also be proven.” ACLU OF 
OREGON, Press Release, Statement on Verdict in Planned Parenthood “Wanted Posters” Case, Feb. 2, 1999. 
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the standard to limit speech must not be a mere threat, but clear evidence that there was intent to 
carry out the threat.100 
Certain aspects of Judge Jones’s instructions were consistent with the established case law. Judge 
Jones was right to instruct that the standard for a “true threat” evaluates the defendant’s behavior in 
relation to the circumstances, rather than looking at the defendant’s subjective state of mind.101 
Similarly, the judge noted that the evaluation must consider the actions from the perspective of a 
reasonable person.102 
The judge was also correct, in part, to note the need for the jury to consider the context of the 
statement made. The factual context of an alleged threat has been a major focus of the Supreme 
Court103 and the Ninth Circuit.104 Yet, Judge Jones defined context too broadly such that his 
definition clearly abetted the plaintiffs. According to Judge Jones, “The word ‘context’ means all of 
the facts and information that would have been known to the person making the statement, 
including the events surrounding each publication of the statement and the reaction of the listeners 
to it.”105 Judge Jones continued to broaden this definition, “The context in this case may include the 
other posters you heard about, other statements and actions by the defendants and others, the 
history of anti-abortion violence, and the reactions of the listeners.”106 As such, Judge Jones’s 
definition of context incorporated virtually any event remotely related to the abortion debate and 
actions committed by individuals completely unrelated to the defendants. 
No other decision has relied on nearly such a vast conception of context. In Watts, for example, 
context was limited to a public rally, not to the history of violence against the President.107 Similarly, 
the context used to evaluate the threat in Kelner was limited to Kelner’s television interview and the 
specific and imminent event of Arafat’s visit to New York City.108 By relying on a definition of 
context that incorporated virtually any event, past or present, that occurred in the abortion debate, 
Judge Jones far exceeded prior restrictions on context. 
Another major flaw is Judge Jones’s failure to mention the political hyperbole exception to the jury. 
An important part of the consideration of context is whether the statement is political hyperbole, 
and thus entitled to First Amendment protection. In Watts, the Court overturned Watts’s conviction 
because it viewed his statement concerning President Johnson as political hyperbole, hence not a 
                                                          
100 See id. 
101 See Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 14; Greenberg, supra note 84, at 680. 
102 See Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 14. 
103 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
104 See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1048 (1996) (“Alleged 
threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the reaction of 
the listeners.”); see also United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990). 
105 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 14-15. 
106 Id. at 15. 
107 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
108 See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1022-1025 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
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threat.109 Kelner reiterated this point, noting that political hyperbole does not fall under the category 
of a “true threat.”110 At the very least, the political hyperbole exception merited consideration by the 
jury, since the alleged threats revolve around a highly political issue, abortion.111 
Yet another problem lies in the judge’s instruction that “even a statement that is . . . conditional can 
amount to a threat in light of the factual context in which the statement was made.”112 This assertion 
that a “conditional” statement can constitute a threat is flawed. In Watts, the Court held that the 
“expressly conditional nature of the statement” indicated that Watts did not make a threat.113 The 
Second Circuit reiterated the need for an unconditional statement in Kelner, defining a threat 
unprotected by the First Amendment as one “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and 
specific.”114 Similarly, Judge Cohn wrote in Baker that “only unequivocal, unconditional and specific 
expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury may be punished.”115 
Additional problems arise from Judge Jones’s instruction that a statement that is “ambiguous . . . [or] 
subtle can amount to a threat.”116 This instruction stands irreconcilable with Kelner’s requirement that 
an unprotected threat must be “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific.”117 Likewise, 
Baker’s standard that “only unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of intention 
immediately to inflict injury may be punished”118 conflicts with Judge Jones’s instruction that 
ambiguous or subtle statements can constitute threats. 
The jury instructions further included the troubling statement that “even if [the jurors] believe that 
the defendants did not intend the statements to be threatening,”119 the jury can still find the 
statements to constitute threats. Judge Jones further stated that the jury “need not find that the 
defendants intended to carry out the threat or were even capable of carrying out the threat in order 
to find that a statement was, in fact, a threat.”120 These instructions severely conflict with prior court 
decisions relying on the “specific intent” element as a safeguard against suppressing protected 
speech.121 In particular, the Ninth Circuit has been clear that intent is essential. Both Twine122 and 
King123 held that a showing of specific intent is required for conviction. 
                                                          
109 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits 
within that statutory term [of a true threat].”). 
110 In Kelner, the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s actions were not protected by the political hyperbole 
exception articulated in Watts. See Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1025. 
111 Judge Jones acknowledged the political nature of this case, making special mention in the jury instructions that the 
merits of abortion is not an issue. In the words of Judge Jones to the jury, “your consideration of plaintiffs’ claims in this 
case should not be influenced in any way by your own personal views on abortion.” Jury Instructions, supra note 39 at 
11. 
112 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 15-16. 
113 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
114 See Kelner, 534 2d. at 1027. 
115 See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
116 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 15-16. 
117 See Kelner, 534 2d. at 1027. 
118 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382. 
119 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 14. 
120 Id. at 16. 
121 See, e.g., Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1025; Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1389; see also Kelner, supra note 61, at 304. 
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A final flaw in the jury instructions is more amorphous: the tone of the instructions stands in stark 
tension with the spirit of the “true threat” standard. The Supreme Court and other courts have been 
clear that the “true threat” standard imposes a high hurdle. For example, Professor Sally Greenberg 
has observed that Baker illustrated the reluctance of courts to punish all but the most egregious of 
threats under the “true threat” standard.124 Yet, Judge Jones’s language undoubtedly gave the jury the 
impression of a far more lenient standard. Certain statements, such as “even a statement that is 
ambiguous, subtle or conditional can amount to a threat”125 and “even if you believe that the 
defendants did not intend the statements to be threatening,”126 suggest leniency and excuses to avert 
First Amendment protection that are absent in prior decisions and hardly reflect the tenet that all 
but the most egregious threats receive constitutional protection. 
D. Why the “True Threat” Standard Protects the “Nuremburg Files” 
Since it appears that Judge Jones misrepresented the “true threat” standard to the jury, the next 
logical question is whether the “Nuremburg Files” should be afforded protection under a properly 
articulated “true threat” standard. Careful consideration of the standard and the specifics of the 
website indicates that the “Nuremburg Files” should receive protection. 
A paramount reason for constitutional protection lies in the simple fact that the website never 
explicitly communicated a threat. In Baker, the Court determined that since the electronic message 
lacked specific language indicating Baker’s intention to follow through with the rape, Baker’s 
statement was protected by the First Amendment.127 In the words of Judge Cohn, “the 
constitutional standard enunciated in Kelner requires, at the very least, that a statement . . . contains 
some language construable as a serious expression of an intent imminently to carry out some 
injurious act.”128 Not only did the website lack specific language indicating intent to follow through 
with a threat, but the website lacked specific language of a threat. 
Indeed, the creators of the “Nuremburg Files” seemed to take great caution to avoid using language 
that expresses a threat. The mission statement of the “Nuremburg Files,” found on the first page of 
the website, stated quite the opposite intention: “The American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) 
is cooperating in collecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipation that one day we may be able to 
hold them on trial for crimes against humanity.”129 Throughout the website, the operators reiterated 
this purpose, with headings such as “We Need Your Help!” and “How You Can Help.”130 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
122 See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988). 
123 See United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1997). 
124 See Greenberg, supra note 84, at 680. 
125 Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 15-16. 
126 Id. at 14. 
127 Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1389. 
128 Id. at 1385-86. 
129 The Nuremburg Files (visited May 9, 1999) <http://www.lektrik.com/PPvsACLA/home.htm>. 
130 Id. 
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In contrast, all prior cases denying constitutional protection under the “true threat” standard 
involved an explicit statement of a threat toward another individual.131 Judge Cohn summarized this 
requisite well in Baker, identifying unprotected threats as “unequivocal, unconditional and specific 
expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury may be punished.”132 In fact, courts have even 
invoked the “true threat” standard to protect explicit threats.133 
The “Nuremburg Files” website also receives protection under the “true threat” standard because of 
the want of a specified target.134 In Baker, Judge Cohn held that the First Amendment protected 
Alkhabaz’s expressions because they lacked a specific target. Similarly, all decisions declining 
protection under the “true threat” standard involved a threat targeted at a specific individual.135 At 
first glance, the target would seem to be the abortion providers listed on the site. Once again, 
however, the creators of the site used careful language to avoid listing the doctors in a manner that 
constituted a threat against them. The website did not purport to communicate with these abortion 
providers; rather, the website sought to communicate with individuals sympathetic to their cause. 
The abortion providers are listed so that they one day can be brought to trial for their crimes.136 The 
website is careful throughout to address all statements to the general population, not to the abortion 
providers. For example, the “Nuremburg Files” has a section entitled “How You Can Help,” which 
informs readers on how they can help gather evidence on abortion providers.137 
A final source of protection for the “Nuremburg Files” under the “true threat” standard resides in 
the political hyperbole exception. Both Watts and Kelner have instructed that if, after evaluating the 
context of the situation, a statement is determined to be political hyperbole, then it falls short of 
constituting a threat.138 In the absence of an explicit threat, and given the intended persuasive nature 
of the website and the inherently political nature of the abortion debate, the content of the 
“Nuremburg Files” stands much closer to being political hyperbole than to constituting a threat. 
IV. THE “NUREMBURG FILES” AND THE INCITEMENT STANDARD 
Although the “Nuremburg Files” should receive protection under the ²true threat² standard, the 
website is not necessarily bereft of First Amendment concerns. Another standard for First 
                                                          
131 See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 1999) (involving a threat to “blow the victim’s head off, 
cut the victim up into a thousand tiny pieces, slit the victim’s throat, and kill the victim”); United States v. Hoffman, 806 
F.2d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving a threat to President Reagan stating, “Ronnie, listen chump! Resign or you’ll get 
your brains blown out.”); United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (involving an abusive relationship in 
which the defendant made threatening calls and statements such as “I’m gonna kill you. Got it? One way or another. 
You’re dead.”). 
132 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382. 
133 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379. 
134 See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1388-90. 
135 See, e.g., Francis, 164 F.3d at 121 (2d Cir. 1999) (threat to a specific victim); Hoffman, 806 F.2d at 704 (threat to 
President Reagan); Sovie, 122 F.3d at 124 (threat to former girlfriend); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1020-21 
(2d Cir. 1976) (threat to Yasser Arafat). 
136 See Lafferty, supra note 24, at 14. 
137 See The Nuremburg Files (visited May 9, 1999) <http://www.lektrik.com/PPvsACLA/home.htm>. 
138 SeeWatts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged 
in by petitioners fits within that statutory term [of a true threat]); Kelner, 534 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1976) (rejecting Kelner’s 
argument that his statement was merely political hyperbole). 
14
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol2/iss1/5
Amendment scrutiny, the incitement standard, may merit consideration.139 In the same term the 
Court created the “true threat” standard in Watts, it articulated the incitement standard in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio.140 This Part looks at the incitement standard, as developed by Brandenburg and its progeny, to 
determine whether the “Nuremburg Files” warrants constitutional protection. 
A. The Incitement Standard 
The Supreme Court first established the incitement standard in Brandenburg,141 a case reviewing the 
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute142 after he made 
several hateful remarks at a televised rally. 143 Reversing his conviction and striking down the statute, 
the Court created the incitement standard: 
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.144 
As such, the Court drew a critical distinction between the “mere advocacy of violence” and 
“incitement to imminent lawless action.”145 
Although Brandenburg, like Watts, was a brief, per curiam opinion, the standard articulated therein has 
become a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence. Brandenburg substantially revised146 
freedom of speech scrutiny by eliminating Justice John Marshall Harlan’s distinction between 
                                                          
139 For example, Robert O’Neil of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression has suggested 
that higher courts may evaluate the “Nuremburg Files” under Brandenburg. O’Neil believes that higher courts might 
side with the defendants because the government may not punish words advocating illegal action unless the words incite 
or produce “imminent lawless action” or are “likely to incite or produce such action.” See McMahon, supra note 40, at 
A3. 
140 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
141 Prior to Brandenburg, the Court had recognized that the right of free speech does not protect utterances that tend to 
incite a crime. See, e.g., Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (vacating convictions for conspiring to commit acts injurious 
to public morals by counseling, advising, and practicing polygamous or plural marriage and holding that it was 
impossible to determine whether convicted on the grounds that the conspiracy was intended to incite immediate 
violation of the law); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (reversing conviction for violating the Criminal 
Syndicalism Law of Oregon and holding that the defendant was not inciting to violence or crime). 
142 The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, in pertinent part, criminalized: 
advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a 
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform . . . [and for] voluntarily assembling with any society, 
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13. 
143 The speech included statements such as “bury the n****” and “if our President our Congress our Supreme Court 
continues to suppress the white Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengance [sic] taken.” 
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 446. 
144 Id. at 447. 
145  
146 See John F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look at the Evolving Understanding of the First Amendment, 43 
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 48 (1994). 
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“good” and “bad” advocacy of unlawful conduct in Dennis v. United States147 and adopting a 
formulation that more closely mirrored that of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes’s and Louis D. 
Brandeis’s dissents, complete with the imminence requirement.148 
Subsequent Supreme Court applications of the incitement standard have stressed the imminent 
lawless action requirement and indicated that the standard imposes a lofty hurdle to overcome. In 
1973, the Court applied the incitement standard in Hess v. Indiana,149 a ruling which reinforced 
Brandenburg’s causation principle.150 Gregory Hess was convicted for violating an Indiana disorderly 
conduct statute151 when he proclaimed to a crowd, “We’ll take the f**** street later,” after the police 
tried to break up an antiwar demonstration.152 The trial court applied Brandenburg and found that 
Hess’s speech was “intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the crowd in the vicinity . 
. . and was likely to produce such action.”153 The Court reversed Hess’s conviction, holding that his 
statement fell short of incitement because it was not directed to any person or group of persons, and 
therefore it was not advocating any action,154 and because his words were not intended to produce, 
or likely to produce, imminent disorder.155 More specifically, the Court noted that Hess’s words, 
“We’ll take the f**** streets later,” could be taken, at best, as “counsel for present moderation” or, 
at worst, as advocating “illegal action at some indefinite future time.”156 According to the Court, 
neither of these interpretations was sufficient to constitute a present threat of imminent disorder.157 
The Court again applied the incitement standard in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company.158 During 
a civil rights boycott, Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP, allegedly threatened 
violence against boycott breakers.159 The Court held that Evers’s speeches did not transcend the 
bounds set forth by Brandenburg because he was making an impassioned plea for black citizens to 
                                                          
147 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Dennis, the penultimate step before the creation of the Brandenburg standard, upheld the 
conviction of organizers of the Communist Party under the Smith Act. See id. at 507. In doing so, a plurality of the 
Court accepted the formulation of Judge Learned Hand in the district court and adopted a clear and present danger test 
that examined the gravity of the conduct: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” Id. at 510 (quoting Dennis v. 
United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
148 See Wirenius, supra note 146. For example, in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Holmes’s dissent, joined 
by Brandeis, argued that “the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a 
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.” Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
149 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
150 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 111 (1992). 
151 The statute provided that: 
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to disturb the peace and quiet any 
neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, 
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct. . . . 
Ind. Code 35-27-2-1, (1971), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-1510 (Supp. 1972). 
152 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 105-07 
153 Hess v. Indiana, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (1973). 
154 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 108-09. 
155 See id. at 109. 
156 See id. at 108. 
157 See id. 
158 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
159 See id. at 898. 
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unify.160 Moreover, the Court noted such appeals are naturally spontaneous and emotional.161 Unless 
these appeals incite lawless action, they receive First Amendment protection.162 
Lower courts have been rather reticent to further develop the incitement standard. In particular, the 
Ninth Circuit has offered very little guidance.163 The Ninth Circuit’s main pronouncement on the 
incitement standard came in United States v. Medenbach,164 a ruling that mainly reiterated Brandenburg’s 
holding. Among the issues in that case was a challenge to a magistrate’s pretrial detention order 
based on the fear that the defendant posed a risk to the safety of other persons because he 
acknowledged intimidation practices, made references to “Ruby Ridge” and “Waco, Texas,” and 
would not follow the conditions of his release.165 The defendant alleged that this order violated 
his constitutional rights by punishing him for the “mere advocacy of unpopular political beliefs.”166 
After reviewing the record, which included evidence that Medenbach armed his forest campsite with 
extensive explosives and that he had warned Forest Service officers of potential armed resistance, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Mendenbach’s statements evinced the type of incitement to 
imminent lawless action that is not protected by the First Amendment under Brandenburg.167 
B. Why the Incitement Standard Protects the “Nuremburg Files” 
Since the plaintiffs never alleged that the defendants’ actions constituted incitement, Judge Jones 
instructed the jury to ignore the incitement standard.168 Therefore, the next logical question asks 
whether, under Brandenburg, the “Nuremburg Files” would receive constitutional protection. An 
examination of this standard leads to the conclusion that the “Nuremburg Files” website still 
receives protection. 
Courts have typically construed the Brandenburg test as requiring the fulfillment of three elements: 
(1) the speaker subjectively intended incitement; (2) in context, the words used were likely to 
produce imminent lawless action; and (3) the words used by the speaker objectively encouraged and 
                                                          
160 See id. at 928. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 Most of the Ninth Circuit’s mentions of Brandenburg have been unrelated to the holding of the court. See, e.g., Scott 
v. Ross, 151 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1998) (mentioning that a KKK leader cannot be arrested for organizing a protest); 
Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing activities not protected under the First Amendment 
and mentioning the incitement standard); U.S. v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that where the speaker is 
likely to foment an attack on or by a third party, his words are not protected by the First Amendment). 
164 116 F.3d 487, No. 96-30168, 1997 WL 206437, Table (June 5, 1997). 
165 See id. at 1. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. at 2. 
168 See Jury Instructions, supra note 39, at 13 (“You are not to consider any evidence that the three statements allegedly 
‘incite’ violence against plaintiffs. You are to consider only whether the statements are ’true threats’. . . .“). 
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urged incitement.169 While the “Nuremburg Files” arguably satisfies the first and third elements, it 
does not satisfy the second element. 
Herein lies the main reason why the website receives protection under the incitement standard. 
Since Brandenburg, courts have regarded “imminent, lawless action” as the primary focus of the 
incitement standard.170 Yet, any incitement that potentially resulted from the “Nuremburg Files” did 
not imminently follow the posting of the website. 
As held in Hess, a delay in time defeats imminence. In Hess, the Court regarded the words of the 
defendant as, at worst, advocating “illegal action at some indefinite future time.”171 As a result, the 
words failed to constitute a present threat of imminent disorder.172 Although violence occurred 
against abortion providers, that violence took place well after the creation of the “Nuremburg Files.” 
Under Hess, this delay between the posting of the website and any resulting lawless action frees the 
website of incitement concerns. 
Moreover, Brandenburg created a speaker-audience relationship that is analogous to that of a principal 
and agent, as liability only attaches when the speaker knows the audience will act as a result of the 
speech and intends that it should do so.173 Under such circumstances, and given the imminence 
requirement, the audience can be said to be acting under the direction of the speaker and in 
fulfillment of the speaker’s will.174 Yet with a website, the existence of a similar speaker-audience 
relationship simply does not exist. The creators of the website were not engaging in a conversation 
with specific individuals, since they did not know exactly who would be viewing the website and 
anyone with Internet access could read their postings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A lenient “true threat” standard, such as the one articulated by Judge Jones, poses very serious 
dangers to freedom of speech. The ACLU, who submitted an amicus curiae brief in the district court 
on behalf of the plaintiffs, agrees that the ramifications of Judge Jones’s standard are frightening.175 
The standard adopted in this case will undoubtedly guide many future cases involving free speech on 
the Internet.176 If Judge Jones’s standard is adopted, the bar for what constitutes a “true threat” will 
                                                          
169 See John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to Determine Media Liability 
for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 969, 972 
(1988). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 149-162. 
171 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). 
172 See id. at 108. 
173 See Wirenius, supra note 146, at 48-49. 
174 See id. at 49 (citing WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BICENTENNIAL 23 (1978); 
John F. Wirenius, Giving the Devil the Benefit of Law: Pornographers, the First Amendment and the Feminist Attack 
on Free Speech, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 70-71 (1992)). 
175 See Lafferty, supra note 24, at 14. 
176 See, e.g., ACLU OF OREGON, Press Release, Statement on Verdict in Planned Parenthood “Wanted Posters” Case, 
Feb. 2, 1999 (“The standard which is finally adopted in this case will apply in many future cases.”). 
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be lowered significantly. One result could be the chilling of constitutionally protected speech, 
thereby jeopardizing the free and robust exchange of ideas.177 
Unlike the “true threat” standard, whose cyberspace implications were evaluated in Baker,178 the 
incitement standard has yet to be considered in the context of the Internet.179 As such, the 
incitement standard represents one of the many constitutional inquiries that remains vacuous in the 
context of the relatively new phenomenon of cyberspace.  
While free speech in cyberspace has received some attention from courts and academia, this 
attention has largely focused on the need to regulate obscenity and pornography on the Internet. 
Yet, no attention has been paid to extending the incitement standard to cyberspace. 
While incitement, the “Nuremburg Files” is not the type of incitement that is currently outlawed 
under the existing standard. This does not mean that the potential for incitement from the 
“Nuremburg Files” is any less real or any more worthy of constitutional protection. Perhaps the flaw 
with applying the incitement standard to the “Nuremburg Files” lies not in this particular website 
but in the nature of the Internet. It may be that when the Supreme Court developed the incitement 
standard in 1973, the justices did not foresee the new demands that the Internet would bring a 
couple of decades later. If the incitement standard does not mesh well with cyberspace, the courts 
need to modify the standard to adapt to the demands of modern technology. Under the present 
standard, however, the website would be afforded protection. 
                                                          
177 See id (The standard “must be carefully drawn to safeguard against any chilling effect on free speech while still 
preventing the First Amendment from being used as a shield by those who make true threats of violence.”). 
178 See supra text accompanying notes 77-87. 
179 The Supreme Court addressed free speech on the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, the Court 
struck down the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which imposed criminal liability on anyone who knowingly 
distributed “indecent” or “patently offensive” material on the Internet to anyone under the age of eighteen. See id. at 
858-60. While supporting the goal of the CDA, the Court held that the Act went too far because it would also prevent 
adults from accessing certain websites. See id. at 868, 874-79. Soon after Reno, Congress passed and President Clinton 
signed the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”), which requires, under penalty of criminal conviction and heavy civil 
fines, that those engaged in selling materials on the Web that is harmful to minors restrict access to such material by 
anyone under the age of seventeen. See Child Online Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31). It remains unclear whether COPA 
will survive constitutional scrutiny. The vast literature on free speech in cyberspace has examined similar topics, focusing 
on government regulation of indecent material on the Internet. See, e.g., Johns, supra note 6 (examining the legal 
doctrines of obscenity and “true threats” in relation to cyberspace); Timothy Zick, Congress, the Internet, and the 
Intractable Pornography Problem: The Child Online Protection Act of 1998, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1147 (assessing 
the constitutionality of COPA and proposing an approach for future legislation seeking to protect children from harmful 
material on the Internet); Wirenius, supra note 174, at 70-71 (discussing pornography on the Internet). 
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